Abstract-Blockchain is one of the hottest topics in the discussion of technologies lately. As the enabling technology for Bitcoin, the pioneering cryptocurrency, blockchain is an appendonly distributed ledger that is virtually impossible to attack given sufficient scale of participants. Hence, blockchain holds great promises as the fundamental technology to enable Internet-based electronic voting. However, Internet-based voting has additional requirements than monetary transactions. In this paper, we analyze these requirements, review existing proposed solutions, and outline possible improvements. Specifically, we propose to use live biometrics of the voter to perform secure and highly reliable remote authentication. We also propose a scheme to protect the secrecy of the ballots and eliminate the influence of votes already cast. Finally, we propose to impose a hierarchy to the voting infrastructure that aligns naturally with traditional voting, which enables parallel processing of multiple blockchains, to overcome the intrinsic scalability limitation of the blockchain technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional voting, especially in the United States, has been a concern for several reasons. First, human errors are inevitable when counting/recounting the votes and vote recount could be a prolonged process. A more accurate and fast vote count/recount could have changed the outcome of the 2000 presidential elections. Second, voting turnout has been low, probably due to the hassle of going to the voting booths. In the 2016 US presidential election, only 60% of people who are eligible to vote cast their ballots (http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/324206-new-reportfinds-that-voter-turnout-in-2016-topped-2012). For state and local elections, the turnout rates are even lower. Third, voter authentication is a great concern in the US because photo identifiers are not officially required. A person could conceivably cast multiple ballots by impersonating different persons. In certain states where same-daily registration is allowed, duplicate voting could be even more a problem. There has been reports that in some precincts, more votes were cast than the number of registered voters (http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/12/ records-many-votes-detroits-precincts/95363314/).
Electronic voting machines have been adopted pervasively in the US. However such machines are proprietary and the vote count is not auditable by the public. Hence, they do not install confidence to the general public. It is not surprising that both democratic party and republican party candidates have claimed that elections have been rigged (http://thefederalist.com/2016/10/19/8-timesliberals-claimed-election-stolen-rigged/). The blockchain technology [14] , if used for voting, could completely change the picture because the technology itself is open both in terms of how it works and its open-source implementation. The blockchain technology could enable every voter to verify if his/her vote has been counted, and enable anyone or any organization to audit the votes tallied. Furthermore, the counting of votes can be done completely automatically without any human intervention, which could eliminate any dispute and refute any claim that the election is rigged.
That said, the blockchain technology cannot be used alone to enable Internet-based voting because voting is quite different from monetary transactions, which blockchain was invented for. Furthermore, the current blockchain implementations have scalability issues in that very limited number of new blocks can be added to the chain in a short period. For example, Bitcoin [14] blockchain allows only 7 transactions per second peak throughput [6] . If we assume that each block contains information about 10 votes, only 252,000 votes can be added to a blockchain per hours. According to this rate, a national election with 60% participation rate in the US would take 329.67 hours, or 13.74 days, to add all the votes cast. This is clearly not acceptable.
In this paper, we outline the requirements for Internet-based voting and review proposed solutions. We identify the gap between these proposed solutions and what is needed, and propose an architecture to enable Internet-based voting based on blockchain. More specifically, we introduce a mechanism to authenticate votes based on live biometric characteristics. Additionally, we proposed to address the scalability issue by enabling parallel blockchains at the precinct-level and a hierarchical structure for vote counting.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
For Bitcoin, a blockchain is used to record and verify transactions [14] . The Bitcoin system is deployed in a completely peer-to-peer network with no centralized control. The blockchain is heavily replicated at each participating node.
Each user of the bitcoin generates a public and private key pairs of 256 bit-long each. Users would use their private keys to sign their transactions. A Bitcoin user is identified by the 160-bit long hash of his/her public key encoded using Base58Check. A set of transactions are grouped together and placed into a new block to be appended to the blockchain. For a participating node (called a miner) to add a new block to the blockchain, it must solve a computationally very expensive puzzle. The SHA2 secure hash function is used to hash several pieces of information, including the transactions in the new block, the hash of the previous block, and a nonce (i.e., a random number that is used only once), as shown in Figure 1 . The puzzle requires the new hash to be smaller than a predefined number. With modern computing hardware, this puzzle is expected to take 10 minutes or so to solve. The first miner who successfully solves the puzzle gets to add the new block to the blockchain. As an incentive, this miner would be awarded a predefined number of Bitcoins and some transaction fee the miner has requested. It is possible for two miners or more that are geographically far apart to solve the puzzle nearly at the same time and different blocks get to add to the previous blockchain as a result. The blockchain would thus fork. At a later stage, the longest blockchain would be chosen by all miners and the forked shorter chains would be abandoned. This scheme is referred to as Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus. This consensus is probabilistic [7] instead of deterministic as do in Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms [3] , [5] , [4] , [18] , [16] , [20] , [17] , [22] , [23] , [19] . Nevertheless, PoW offers a practical way to solve the consensus problem with a large scale of computing nodes. Byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithms cannot be scaled to the size of Bitcoin networks [21] .
Next, we show that it is very difficult to attack the blockchain. One could attempt to alter some of the transactions in the new block. Such attacks could be easily defeated as long as the majority of the miners are honest, which would produce a different and consistent new block and the faulty block will be abandoned. To increase the likelihood that the majority of the miners have received a new block, a miner would wait until 6 new blocks to confirm the oldest of the 6 blocks [15] . That is why there is an hour latency in confirming a new block. As a tradeoff, these 6 blocks would be vulnerable to attacks, such as the double-spending attack [8] . Once a block is confirmed, it is virtually impossible to be attacked because a hacker would have to solve a much harder puzzle, i.e., to find a nonce with an altered transaction that would lead to exactly the same block hash as before. That is why the blockchain is referred to as an immutable public ledger.
Unlike for Bitcoin-based monetary transactions, where any user could pay for some Bitcoins, and transact using Bitcoins, voting requires that only legal citizens can vote. This is a huge difference. Hence, a blockchain is far from sufficient from enabling Internet-based voting. This requirement for voting necessitates the involvement of the government. A separate system must be in-place to verify the citizenship and residency status of a voter before the person can be registered with the system. How to set up such a system is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, any developed democratic county should have already had a robust system for voter registration. Even with a robust voter registration system, Internetbased voting would still have to overcome the challenge of authenticating a voter remotely. Several studies from the industries have investigated the use the blockchain technology for Internet-based voting [9] , [1] , [2] . They all concluded that the security risks are greater than the benefits citing primarily the concern on the difficulty of authentication of a voter remotely.
Academically, several publications have reported work on developing electronic voting systems based on blockchain [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . These researches recognize the need to protect the privacy of the votes, i.e., from the records in the blockchain blocks, one should not trace back whom a voter has voted for. In [11] , a trusted third party is employed to authenticate each voter using the hash of the secret message created for each voter by the organization that is in charge of voter registration. The separation of duties between the voter registration organization and the trusted third party for administering the election ensures certain degree of privacy. It is also common to use one blockchain for each candidate. Naturally, the winning candidate would have the longest blockchain. Recognizing the scalability limitation of blockchain, the algorithm proposed in [13] is explicitly for boardroom voting only. A Diffie-Hellman based algorithm is used to protect the privacy of the voters. Due to the specific assumption of boardroom election, all eligible voters must vote for the algorithm to work, which is obviously not applicable for general public elections.
III. REMOTE VOTER AUTHENTICATION
We believe that the current technology is sufficient to ensure highly secure and reliable voter authentication. Hence, remote voter authentication cannot be used as the excuse for not implementing Internet-based voting. The concerns for security risks of remote voter authentication are blown out of proportion in [9] , [1] , [2] when no photo id is required for (traditional) voting in the US. We propose that the biometric information of every eligible voter is recorded at the time of registration, including fingerprint, iris, and facial characteristics. Such biometric data must be updated periodically to ensure that the voter is still alive and thereby giving a small window for someone impersonating a dead person. While remotely authenticating to vote, a voter would be asked to submit the recorded biometric information to the system (such as via a smart phone app or full desktop computer application with a webcam). The camera in the system would also monitor eye blinking, and possibly monitor body temperatures to ensure a live person is authenticating with the voting system. With such mechanisms, it is impossible for a hacker to impersonate another eligible voter. The nationwide biometrics database would also eliminate the possibility for anyone to vote multiple times while impersonating as different persons.
IV. VOTE SECRECY Vote secrecy means that the general public cannot find out whom a voter has voted for. As long as only eligible voters could vote, we cannot achieve absolute vote secrecy because it is inevitable to rely on a centralized voter registration organization to register and authenticate a voter. This organization must be trusted by the general public and it has the means to trace back who voted for whom.
Similar to [11] , we assume that a pseudo-identifier is created for a voter at the time of voter authentication and it is used for the voter to cast a vote. More specifically, the voter would use a key generator to generate a public-private key pair. The public key would be used as the voter id. This voter id is temporarily linked to the voter portfolio for the current election. This voter id should be different for different elections to maximize vote secrecy. This design is compatible with the requirement for blockchain, where the user's public key is used as the user identifier.
V. VOTING TRANSPARENCY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The nice feature for blockchain is that anyone could examine the transactions in the blocks in the blockchain. While this feature is good to ensure voting transparency, it is desirable only when the election has officially ended because otherwise, voters might be unduly influenced by votes that have cast before them. For example, if they see their candidate has fallen significant short in votes, they might choose not to vote at all. Hence, prior to the conclusion of an election, the votes cast must be kept secret so that the other voters cannot figure out which candidates (or bills) are winning. The intuitive idea of using one blockchain for each candidate (or bill) will not work because the chain length would reveal who is winning.
To address this concern, we propose that for one election, a single blockchain is used (we will change this for the A single (long) blockchain Multiple blockchains with one per region Fig. 3 . By using multiple blockchains with one per region, we can significantly increase the scalability of voting system. scalability reason in the next section). Each block would contain a set of ballots. Each ballot would contain a voter's choices in multiple candidates and/or bills, possibly at different levels (national, state, or local). Furthermore, the ballot is encrypted using a symmetric key generated by the voter. Similar to PGP, as shown in Figure 2 , the voter would encrypt his/her encryption key using the election organization's public key. This way, the general public could only see how many votes have been cast, but not who (or which bill) is winning before the conclusion of an election. Furthermore, a voter's votes are further protected by encryption and only the election organization can decrypt the ballot. At the conclusion of the election, the election organization would make the encryption keys public so that anyone could inspect the ballots. Simple programs can be written to automatically count the votes.
VI. OVERCOMING THE BLOCKCHAIN SCALABILITY LIMITATION
As we pointed earlier, the existing Bitcoin blockchain stipulation would make it impossible to conduct a large scale election using the technology. We address the scalability issue by creating a hierarchical structure in the voting infrastructure that matches well with the US traditional election. Each election unit, which can be as large as a county, or as small as a precinct, manages a blockchain (instead of a single blockchain for the entire election). This scheme would naturally enable parallel processing in a large scale for a national election, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We consider several practical issues for Internet-based voting. First, despite the wealth in the US, there are still significant number of people who do not have computers and/or do not have the Internet access. In this case, traditional voting centers are still needed. People could go to these centers to vote using the Internet-connected computers installed at the centers. Second, to ensure the security and robustness of the blockchain-based voting infrastructure, huge number of miners are needed. The reason why Bitcoin can work is because it pays the miners who successfully solve the puzzle first for each new block. Similar incentives would be necessary to attract miners for the voting infrastructure. Voting is an expensive activity in any country. It is conceivable to anticipate tax-payer funding be allocated for each election. For financial viability, while there is no election, the infrastructure could be used to participate cryptocurrency or other activities that require the blockchain technology. Indeed, we envisage the creation of companies that specialize in providing blockchain mining services for various purposes (election would be one of them) in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the challenges of using the blockchain technology to build an Internet-based voting system. First, voter authentication must be highly reliable to ensure the integrity of elections. Several studies concluded that it is too risky to allow Internet-based voting. We disagree with such an assessment because we have already robust biometricbased authentication solutions that have been pervasively used to protect critical facilities, such as data centers. There is no reason to use the security risk as the excuse not to move forward to the next generation voting technologies. The security concern is blown out of proportion considering that Internet-based e-commerce has exceeded a trillion US dollars in recent years. When trillions of dollars could transact over the Internet securely by millions of users, we see no reason not to adopt Internet-based voting. Second, we outline solutions to ensure vote secrecy, voting transparency and the related voting integrity, as well as a way of overcoming the blockchain scalability limitation using parallel processing. In future work, we plan to conduct a simulation study using available open blockchain platform such as multichain (https://www.multichain.com/). 
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